Administering Justice the Medical Prepossession by Lightner, Clarence A
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 17 Issue 8 
1919 
Administering Justice the Medical Prepossession 
Clarence A. Lightner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clarence A. Lightner, Administering Justice the Medical Prepossession, 17 MICH. L. REV. 666 (1919). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol17/iss8/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ADMINISTERING JUSTICE-THE MEDICAL 
PREPOSSESSION. 
"The State, in conjunction with the other guilds, will deal 
with it by a just and righteous judgment." 
T HIS quotation is from a recent document coming from con-serirative and intelligent sources, recommending as a cure 
for economic and commercial unrest, and other evils, the 
creation of a League of National Guilds. 
Underlying the whole scheme is the question whether it will 
work. Assuming the tmth of the above quoted sentence, the out-
come would be hopeful. This is, however, by no means an excep-
tional illustration of the child-like faith of the layman in his abil-
ity to create a tribunal which will administer "just and righteous 
judgment." 
Justice is the most important matter in human existence, and there 
is nothing which will help the world, especially at present, as much 
as justice. · . 
Any scheme, including that of the proposed League of National 
9uilds, must be administered ultimately by human agents, and the 
frailty of human nature is the principal reason why justice does not 
always prevail. This has always been true. 
No people in ancient times had a higher ~thjcal sense, an~ cer-
tainly no people had leaders who appreciated the need of "righteous 
judgment" better than the Hebrews. Among them justice was ad· 
ministered ·by the magistrate, usually sitting and holding his court at 
the gate of the city. Questions involved must have been simple, 
but justice did not always result, and largely because bribery was 
a habit, although it was frequently cloaked under the expression of 
free will gifts. One needs only to read how Samuel (perhaps the 
most righteous man produced by the Jewish people) prided him· 
self upon his integrity as a judge,1 while his two sons inducted by 
him into the judicial office became notorious bride takers,2 to under• 
stand why the Jewish prophets continually preached "judgment," 
"justice'' and "righteousness." No judge, in this country at least, 
· would think it appropriate to call attention to the fact that he had 
administered his office honestly, because, with few exceptions, judges 
are now honest. HQwev~r, conditions are different, and though 
~ See 1 Samuel, Chap. 1::, verses 3 to 6. 
2 See I Samuel, Chap. 8, verses I to 3. 
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bribery may be unusual, administering justice, either in the courts 
or elsewhere, is, in the vast complexity of modem life, a difficult 
matter in many respects, because of the same frailty of human 
nature. 
Directing our attention especially to the administration of criminal 
justice, the best tribunal will be one which has at its disposal, in an 
uncommon degree, such ordinary qualities as patience, common 
sense and human sympathy. It would be better if such a tribunal 
should know nothing of the controversy in question, and especially 
not the facts from which the prosecution arises. · 
Roman jurispntdence, in its Golden Age, developed these merits. 
Jn fact, under the Roman practice the trial judge was not supposeQ. 
even to know the law. He certainly was not selected because of 
his knowledge of science. He heard the evidence submitted to him, 
and i£ a decision of the matter in controversy called for knowledge, 
on his part, of any scientific matter, he secured advice thereon from 
men who were versed in that particular science. To answer his 
doubt as to the law of the case he inquired of the juris-consulti. 
'rhe trial judge usually had the common qualities above commended, 
which enabled him, if opinions varied, to choose the better advice. 
Not only did this method result in the most remarkable system of 
laws which the world has ever produced, but it worked remark-
ably well in prjlctice, until the evils incident to the Empire, and 
resulting largely from conquest and prosperity, had undermined it. 
It was when justice failed to be fairly administered that the Roman 
Empire declined and fell. Human frailty was the underlying cause 
thereof. 
The English metliod of ad~inistering criminal justice is not the 
result of a theory, .and certainly not (as in the case of the proposed 
National Guilds) of a scheme prepared for the future. It is the 
outcome of experience. It is tl_ie fruit . of centuries of agony en-
dured by_ the English people. Our jury system is the principal 
result of this historical experience. We have, therefore, also in 
America at the present time, in the administration of criminal justice, 
a judge, who is supposed to know the law, and a jury, which is the 
final arbiter as to the disputed facts involved in the litigation. To 
this tribunal, namely, judge and jury, the facts are submitted by 
witnesses who know matters pertinent to the controversy. When . 
a question of scientific knowledge arises, expert witnesses, ·i. e.,-... 
persons who, in the particular branch of scientific knowledge, are 
learned and experienced, are called to advise the tribunal upon 
these matters. If all witnesses were honest, and if all experts un-
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derstood matters upon which they were called to testify, and 
assuming that the judge and jury were capable and honest men, 
the administration. of justice, even under the present complicated 
conditions of life, would be as nearly ,perfect as one could desire. 
While the jury, as a factor in the machinery of justice, has 
received most severe criticism, one who understands English history 
will agree that it is, perhaps, the most beneficial element therein. 
With all of its weaknesses, it has worked. The value of the jury 
(its province being to determine disputed questions of fact) has so 
thoroughly approved itself that there is no civilized nation which 
has not tried to incorporate the idea of the English jury into its 
system of administering jtistice in criminal cases. With us, as 
well as in England, the jury has, by constant ha:bit, been made 
tolerable, if not admirable, but elsewhere the success of the jury 
has varied, just.as the ability to use a new tool depends largely upon 
the skill of tbe hands in which it is placed. 
Erskine's words are as true now as they were in the year I799= 
"Indeed, if I were to be asked what it is which peculiarly 
distinguishes this·nation froi;n the other nations of the world, 
I should say that it is in HER COURTS she sits above 
. them: That it is to her judicial system she owes the stability 
-of all her other institutions.'13 
The foregoing has been suggested upon reading a medico-legal 
book written by Dr. George W. Jacoby.4 The. author is well vouch-
ed for as one learned in medicine, and especially in his particular 
branch thereof. The book itself fully meets any expectation which 
the author's name might create in one reading the book. Upon the 
medical aspects of the subject, it seems to us that Dr. Jacoby has 
herewith presented to the profession a valuable contribution on the 
subject. The last half of the book, wherein is considered, under 
•The quotation is from the early part of Lord Erskine's speech in defense of the 
Earl of Thanet, and is quoted from page 407 of Volume II of the edition of Erskine's 
Speeches, published by Reeves and Turner, of London, in 1870, 
•The title page is reproduced in this note: 
''The Unsound Mind and the Law", 
A Presentation of Forensic Psychiatry, by George W. Jac6by, M.D., 
Author of "Child Training as an Exact ~cience" 
Fellow of the New York Academy of Medicine, Member of the American Medical Asso-. 
ciatlon, American Neutological Association, and New York Neurological Society, 
Consulting Neurologist to the Hospital for Nervous Diseases, The Ger· 
man Hospital, The Beth Israel Hospital, The Red Cross Hos-
pital, and the Infirmary for Women and Children in 
the City of New York etc. 
Funk & Wagnalls Company Publishers, 1918. 
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Part Second, "Psychiatric Expertism," and under Part Third there-
of, "Special Anomalies" is above criticism, at least by one who is 
not qualified to speak learnedly on this branch of knowledge. As 
compared with previous literature on this general subjec;t, !the 
author's work shows a marked advance in the method of treatment 
and arrangement, a~ well q.s in the views upon the matters therein 
expressed. The Chapter on the "Examination of the Insane" (being 
Chapter VI. of Part First) is· also of substantial value. I believe 
that there is little to be criticised in these portions of the book. Cer-
t~inly, I refrain from undertaking any such criticism. 
Dr. Jacoby does not profess to be a lawyer, nor to ~ave had any 
education or experience in the administration of justice, except as 
he may have come in touch with the eourts as an expert witness. 
I wish he had refrained from the expression of his· views regarding 
the law. However, he is not the only medical scientist wl:io feels 
that the law is a totally different proposition from medicine. The 
assumption is that medicine is a learned science, which only a man 
like Dr. Jacoby, who has studied it, and who has practised it during 
his lifetime, can talk about as an expert, while, on the contrary, 
any layman is quite competent to discuss the administration of 
justice, and correct the evils therein, and for this purpose one learn-
ed in medicine is as capable as the ordinary layman. It is this atti-
tude, and the expression thereof in this book, which calls for care-
ful and painstaking consideration. I think the author errs as 
much in what he says in his discussion of the law as he is, doubtless, 
right in his comments upon medicine.r• · . 
It has always seemed to me that, to produce a valuable book, 
dealing seriously with two learned professions, collaboration· is 
advisable. The most valuable general book on Medical Jurisprud-
ence is that of Wharton & Stille, published in 1885. No extravagant 
statements upon either law or medicine appear therein, because 
each of the two authors attended especially to his own branch of 
knowledge.6 
s Justice Brooke expressed clearly, and in simple language, the qualification8 for 
judicial duties, in his eulogy upon the late Justice McAlvay of the Michigan Supreme 
Court. The proceedings had in the Supreme Court on this occasion on April 4o 1916, are 
found in the Preface to Vol. l!ll of the Michigan Reports. I quote from Justice Brooke's 
remarks, in support of my comments in the text, the following from page XXXVI: 
"Few outside the profession have more than a vague notion of the law, or any intelligent 
comprehension either of its excellencies or its defects." · · 
•To aid the reader who may not have Dr. Jacoby's book at hand, these few excerpts 
from "The Unsound Mind and the Law" are given herewith: 
"Why is it that psychiatry which could and should he of so great aid tc> the jurist, 
is as yet inadc<quately appreciated by judges and lawyers? 
"The answer tc> these questions is that alt layme11-and jurists are laymen in this 
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The author of "The Unsound Mind and the Law" believes that 
judges should learn psychiatry _and other .branches of medicine. 
Differing absolutely with Dr. Jacoby, I think that a study of med-
icine by our judges would be a mistake. I have seen it in practice 
that a judge who professes to understand medicine is less qualified 
thereby as a judicial officer. He cannot know all medicine, not 
even all psychiatry, and a study of the subject will tend to make of 
him that most dangerous man in the administration of justice, 
. namely, a dilletante. It is the province of the medical expert to 
advise the court and jury regarding scientific facts, when they come 
into question. 
The author likewise complains tha~ the law is "archaic," "con-
servative" and "stagnant,'' and he suggests that when a difference 
arises the law should yield to the scien~e of medicine because 
"medical facts alone are sta:ble." The error contained in this state-
ment, which finds more or less acceptance outside of the legal pro-
fession, is a principal cause of the unsatisfactory administration of 
criminal justice at the present time. 
Confining my attention !O psychiatry, the constant changes in 
medical scientific knowledge will ·s~irprise one who has not directed 
his attention to the matter. 
Tl:_ie meaning of the word "insanity" (which of course the law 
accepted fro~ medicine) is a simple illustration of this change; or 
regard-notwithstanding all efforts to enlighten them, still remain entirely ignorant con· 
cerning mental disease and are prejudiced against occupying themselves in any way with 
the questions it involves." Clntroduction, p. 7). 
"The object of the physician who testifies in court should be no different, and it iS 
this common purpose ¢at imposes upon the physician the duty of acquiring adequate 
juristic knowledge, and upon the jurist the obligation to instruct himself in regard to 
such facts in medicine and the natural sciences as are of importance in the field we are 
now c•msidering." (Introduction, p. 4). 
"The extent to which the subject-matter must consequently suffer becomes particu· 
larly manifest when the more recent advances in psychiatric medicine are contrasted with 
the conservatism, or let us rather say stagnation, that exists in English and American 
laws in the same field." (Preface, p. v}. 
"Wherever the existing law and modern medicine disagree, there is a tendency to 
give the former a more plausible recognition than it actually deserves, or to assume that 
the latter, notwithstanding its scientific basis, is at least problematic, and therefore to 
attempt to fashion it to accord with the juristic mold." (Preface, p. v}. 
"I laid stress upon the possibility that a person who had committed a criminal act 
while under the bane of a morbid impulse of the will might be legally convicted, because 
the law, while it accorded an exculpatory value to abnormal intellectual activity, dealt 
otherwise with disorder5 that implicated the activity of the will." (Introduction. p. 3}. 
"But it distinguishes only two poseibilities, responsibility and irresponsibility, a dis· 
tinction which in many instances seems to be too abrupt and which represents a practical 
hardship." (P. 81). 
"It is for the latter group of cases that the adoption of the notion of restricted re-
sponsibility would be in accord with all scientific facts, as well as being a great practical 
help alike to the judges and the medical expert." (P. Sa). 
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development, in medicine, and of the serious injury resulting there-
by to the law and its administration. The word "insanity," until 
of recent date, has included defective development as well as lesion 
of the mental faculties.7 The law, in its legislative and judicial 
branches adopted this definition of insanity from medicine. Legis-
lation and judicial decisions used the word in this broad sense, and 
the word connoted, substantially, mental deficiency from any 
·source.8 
During comparatively recently years, however, the medical pro-
fession has (and I have no doubt with good reason) come to regard 
mental deficiency, at least from the medical point of view, as a 
radically different disease from other forms of insanity. At all 
events the medical profession has made a distinction between mental 
deficiency (that is, amentia) on the one hand, and insanity (that is, 
dementia) on the other. 
The valuable work by A. F. Tredgold, of London, entitled "Mental 
Deficiency" ( amentia) first published in 19o8, and especially the 
second edition, bearing date 1915, treats in a most satisfactory man-
ner of the feeble-minded (amen ts), to the exclusion of the insane· 
(dements). The discussion in Dr. Tredgold's book of the English 
Mental Deficiency Act of I913, and the investigation which pre-
<:eded the enactment of that statute, are illuminative of this whole 
subject. 
Dr. Henry Herbert Goddard, Director of the Department of Re-
search of Vineland Training School, New Jersey, has spent his life 
in the study of the feeble-minded, and he is recognized, not only 
in this country, but also abroad, as a leading authority upon the 
subject.0 
His narrative of the case of Gianini, included in the book on 
"'!'he Criminal Imbecile," published by him in I9I5, impresses me 
with the marv~llously accurate results which one learned in the 
T The small book of Marshall D. Ewell, first" published in 1887, contains on pages 
337 to 341, the classificatioM of insani~ by four of the learned alienists, including Dr. 
Ray. Mental deficiency is included in most, if not all, of these classifications, under the 
general term insanity. · 
•In Michigan legislation the words "insane" or "insanity" were used in the compre. 
~ensive sense, and the words "feeble-minded" or "imbecile" did not appear until in recent 
years. In 1873 was adopted an act providing for the barring of a woman's right of 
dower in the la!_lds of her husband when she remained incompetent for two ye~rs or more. 
The words "imbecile" ·and "idiotic" are used in this statute in addition to the word 
"insane." This is exceptional, however, in earlier Michigan legislation. 
9 Dr. Goddard's larger work is doubtless well-known to the medical profession, en-
titled-"Feeble-mindedness, its Causes and Consequences." "The Kallikak Family" and 
the "Criminal Imbecile", etc., preceded the more serious work, and perhaps are inore 
interesting to the layman. 
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subject, and inclined to aid an intelligent judge, can, even under 
great handicaps, accomplish. But the lawyer is surprised to find 
that Dr. Goddard thinks that the Gianini case established "a new 
standard in criminal procedure," because "it recognizes that weak-
ness of mind, as an e.xcuse for crime, is of the same importance as 
disease of mind;' ; he continues: "puts feeble-mindedness in the 
same category with insanity, and requires that it, like insanity, be 
considered in a11 discussions of responsibility. When we add the 
now accepted fact that the feeble-minded are at least as numerous 
as the insane, we see the- far-reaching significance of this standard 
set by the Supreme Court of Herkimer County, New York." 
(page 2). 
Of course this is not true. It seemed to be true in this Gianini 
case, as well as elsewhere, because the medical profession, which 
taught the law to give one meaning to the word insanity, has now 
limited it to one-half of the subject.10 
Whatever the frailties of judges and lawyers may be, and they 
are many, and however unsatisfactory the application of the prin-
ciples of law to the particular case, when the defense of insanity is 
raised, may have been, the law has always allowed for mental 
incompetency. 
"If there is any ground for complaint, therefore, it is not 
that the law e.xcludes truth or theory, but that it does not 
exclude humbug and ignorance. It is better that the doors 
should be left open, for experience will rectify errors, and 
may profit by discoveries. But no complaint is more ground· 
less than tliat insanity, of whatever nature, cannot be allowed 
for sufficiently in any court of justice." 
With these words the late Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court 
of Michigan closes a most interesting paper, prepared by him in 
1870, upon the subject: "Does the Law deal fairly with Questions 
of Insanity ?"11 Justice Campbell's article, nothwithstanding the 
10 While I have not the book at hand, I have been advised that a recent book on 
Mental Disease, generally accepted by the medical profession, and referred to as an 
authority in medical education, deClares that the word insanity is not a medical term, 
but is used only by the law and the legal profession. 
llThe article ·herein referred to was read before the Medico-Legal Society of New 
York, on December 8, 1870. We refer to the publication thereof, appearing in Mcdico-
Legal Papers, First Series, published in 1889, by Clark Bell of New York. The article 
is found on pp. 234. to 249 of the 3rd illustrated edition of the work. This article ante-
dates the opinions of th~ Michigan Supreme Court written by Justice Campbell, affecting 
Medico-Legal questions, shown in People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, and in People v. Millard, 
s3 Mich. 03. 
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lapse of time, contains the best discussion of the law, upon the 
responsibility of the alleged insane, that I know of. In the clear-
ness and simplicity of his language, and in the absolute correctness 
of his attitude towards the law, and his fairness to the medical man, 
the article is comparable to Lord Erskine's speech, delivered in 188o, 
in defense of J ~es Hadfield. 
I will rest with one other illustration (although there are many 
!suggested in Dr. Jacoby's book) of the embarrassment resulting to 
the law from the changes in scientific psychiatry. 
Dementia praecox is the form of insanity which is most favored 
by the medical profession at this time, and it is given a prominent 
place in Dr. Jacoby's nook. While doubtless Kraepelin's work was 
of substantial value in the study of mental disease, the law should 
not be severely criticised if it does not at once .drop all the learn-
ing from medical science which_ preceded Kraepelin, and regard 
dementia praecox as the last word on this subject. Clevenger's 
work on Medical Jurispurudence of Insanity was well regarded by 
both professions at the time it appeared in 1898, but the words 
"dementia praecox" are not found in either of the two volumes. 
On the contrary he has a chapter entitled "Vesanias," .being Chapter 
XX in Volume I. Vesania is an unknown quantity in more recent 
books, and is not found in that of Dr. Jacoby. 
Dr. Reese's text book on Medical Judisprudence and Toxicology. 
was one of the earliest American books upon this subject, and the 
original author, and the revisors of the recent editions, were men 
associated with the University of Pennsylvania, and it has appeared 
continuously as a Blakiston publication, also of Philadelphia. The 
Sixth Edition is dated in 1902 and the Eighth Edition in 19n. The 
treatment of insanity, and the classification thereof, in the Sixth 
Edition (see pages 323, etc., thereof) is substantially different from 
that 'given in the Eighth Edition (see page 295, etc., thereof). 
Dementia praect>x appears first in the Eighth Edition, as a prin-
cipal division in the varieties of insanity.12 
Therefore a judge, who had accepted medical learning on the 
subject of insanity previous to the time when the profession gen-
erally adopted Kraepelin's views, would be required to completely 
change his ideas upon this matter. I am impressed with the thought 
that when Dr. Jacoby iq.sists that ju9,ges should learn medicine, he 
would be content only if the court should know and adopt, as a 
principle of law, opinions which Dr. Jacoby and his associates at 
" Dementia praecox was pot known to the compilers of the Century Dictionary in 
J890. The supplement thereto, published in 19u, first mentions the words. 
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the present time deem to be correct. The Court should disabuse 
his mind of that :which he had with much labor learned previous 
to the adoption of the prevalent views in the medical profession 
with reference to dementia praecox. 
Differing radically with the author in this matter, I believe that 
the principal failing of the medical expert, especially in the branches 
of knowledge dealing with the human mind, is the air of finality 
with which he writes and talks. Almost continuously since the time 
of Hippocrates has this been the attitude of medicine towards the 
law. It is the comfortable assurance of the scientist that every 
expert going before him, and differing from him, was wrong, but 
that the view entertained by the present writer is not only correct 
but ·it is final. The expert becomes impatient with the layman, and 
especially with the judge and the lawyer who do not accept, upon 
those tenns, the present statement of the psychiatrist. One has 
only to review, in a cursory manner,· what is called the progress 
of science in this branch of ktiowledge, to be impressed with the 
fact that the views of Dr. Jacoby may not in all particulars be 
right, and may possibly in the future ·be modified. 
A timely antidote to this attitude of the medical profession is 
found in an article which appeared in the December, 1917, Atlantic 
Monthly, entitled "The Human Soul and the Scientific Preposses-
sion." I am not accepting a brief in support of the views of Mr. 
Warner Fite, the author of that article, upon psychology in general, 
but it does seem that he is not far afield when he closes his vigorous 
article with the following: 
"All of these prepossessions find their logical expression, 
however, in the cult of scientific management and scientific 
efficiency. which, I should say, represents the real German 
propaganda in this cotintry for a generation past. Every 
one has his own theory of the war. To me it seems that if 
the war has any deep-lying significance, it is war of human-
ity against the scientific prepossession." 
Dr. Jacoby and I agree that there are miscarriages of justice in 
the administration of law in the criminal courts .(and where is 
there not?), but we differ radically regarding the causes and the 
cure. The author in several places states that his book is limited 
to "borderline" cas.es in psychiatry. Am~ng other things he believes 
that the law should accept his (it may be a medical) doctrine of 
restricted responsibility. He appreciates that the province of the 
law is to determine responsibilty, and that this question may not 
be the same as· the pathological one which presents itself to the 
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medical man in his practice. While the expression of the legal 
principle of responsibility of the alleged insane (as derived from 
what is called the McNaghten case) is not altogether satisfactory, 
it is at least workable. The purpose of a legal prosecution is to 
determine the clear cut issue whether the defendant was, under 
the rules of law, responsible for his act. If he was responsible, 
the jury should find him guilty, and if he was not, the jury should 
acquit him. This rule has the merit at least of being comparatively 
simple. Even with the aid of medical advice it has not resulted 
in a correct verdict by any means in all cases. If by "border-line" 
cases the author means those in which the medical expert is un-
certain, the law humanely applies the rules that a respondent in 
a criminal case is presumed to be innocent, and that he must be 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. These elementary prin-
ciples of criminal law have, also, been found to ·be. reasonable and 
to be advisable. Such a doctrine as restricted responsibility would 
not result in a more desirable administration of criminal justice. 
It was a matter of surprise to learn, recently, from a conserva-
tive authority in psychology and allied sciences, that, during the past 
quarter century, and as a result of the work of laboratories estab-
lished for that purpose, "tests have been developed that are rapid-
ly making the diagnosis of mental diseases as accurate as that 
which has become possible in the earlier de_veloped clinical 
branches. "18 
Assuming that this statement is only moderately true, it is un-
fortunate indeed that the administration of justice should not in 
some manner be supplied with this accuracy. Even the medical 
profession, and certainly the public at large, understand that this 
statement is far removed from the results which are seen to this 
day in criminal trials, when mental disease is involved. 
It is because. I know that Dr. Jac<;>by has a large and cordial 
hearing in the t'nedical profession that I regret both the attitude, 
which he assumes with reference to the legal aspects of this sub-
ject, as well as what he has written. I do not dwell upon the many 
other items, similar to the foregoing, in which I feel he is wrongly 
advised. In these respects the book is a dangerous one, not only 
because it evidences Dr. Jacoby's attitude when he enters the court 
as a medical expert, but also because his book gives to the medical 
profession a false impression of the law, and a wrong idea of the 
:is See Dr. \V. B. Pillsbury's article "The New Developments in Psychology in the 
Past Quarter Century," appearing in Volume XXVI of the Philosophical Review for 
January 1917, at pp. 58 and 59. 
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province of the medical expert, of the judge, and of the jury, in 
criminal cases. 
It is apparent ~at his book will lead his fellow practitioner, who 
has not equal education or experience as has the author, in mental 
diseases, to assume that he can pose as a medical expert in court 
upon these subjects~ and that he can fit himself for this difficult and 
serious ~ndertaking by reading the author's book. It will result there-
from (as. has been the case· frequently in the past) that when the 
queston of insanity is und~r consideration in a court of justice, there 
will be presented to the judge and jury the views, not only of the 
-learned, but . also of the tyros in medical knowledge,-all of them 
talking with the same assumption of infallibility, but not all of them 
talking alike. This is the principal reason for failure in the admin-
istration of justice in these cases. It is a cause of regret that, unin-
tentionally perhaps, this book will aggravate the evil, rather than 
allay it. There is altogether too much in medical instruction and lit-
erature tending to mcike the medical witness critical of the ministers 
of justice .. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan felt compelled, in its opinion in 
People v. Dickerson,1~ to hold that.some provisions of. the Michigan 
statute of 1905, with reference to expert witnesses, were void, and 
its conclusion in that opinion contained the following: 
"We do not overlook the fact that the statute here consid-
ered was designed to correct an evil long recognized as tend-
ing to bring the administration of the criminal law into dis-
repute, in cases where insanity is urged as a defense, but we 
are of the opinion that the true remedy for this evil rests in 
the development of a livelier sense of responsibility to the 
public for the proper and decent administration of justice on 
the part of both the legal and the medical professions, rather 
than in revolutionary legislation. That both professions rec-
ognize and deplore the existence of the evil, there can be no 
doubt, and recent activities in both lend reason for hoping 
that the scandal which has often attended the introduction of 
expert testimony· will, in the future, cease to be a reproach in 
the administration of criminal law." · 
Agreeing cordially with the views of the court in this respect, I 
·commend the same to members of the medical profession who may 
read.and be influenced by :'The Unsound Mind and the Law." 
CLAro:NC:e A. LIGH'l'N:C:R. 
Detroit, Michigan. 
"' 164 Mich. 148 (1910). 
